THE IRAN--CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts From Secord: ‘We Believed in. . .What We Were Doing’

\o7 WASHINGTON\f7 —  Following are excerpts from testimony Tuesday by retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord to the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair: Opening Statement

“In these undertakings, I coordinated my efforts with various government officials and I asked other men to assist me in their private capacity. . . . There was indeed compensation paid to the private parties, but no one undertook these missions for compensation alone. We believed very much in the significance of what we were doing, and that our conduct was in furtherance of the President’s policies. I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it. . . .

“It should come as no surprise that I have a great deal of respect and admiration for Adm. (John M.) Poindexter (former national security adviser) and Lt. Col. (Oliver L.) North. . . . All of us have had to suffer and endure a painful assault upon our motives and integrity, inspired by incredible misinformation and speculation, mainly in the media. . . .

“In agreeing to testify, I have returned to the position I embraced at the time the attorney general of the United States prematurely went public with his grossly inaccurate disclosures about our operations. The decision of Mr. (Edwin) Meese, and possibly others, to succumb to anxiety and ignorance is particularly unforgivable. . . . He could have been advised of the facts surrounding these events before his announcement.

“This reasonable option was rejected and we were instead betrayed, abandoned and left to defend ourselves.”

Meetings With North

(Secord said he met North in 1981, while the two lobbied Congress to approve the sale of AWACS radar-equipped aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and a second time in early 1984.)

“The next time I saw him was the result of a phone call that I got from him asking me if I could drop by for a chat sometime (in June or July of 1984). . . . He said that I no doubt had noted that the support for the contras on the Hill was greatly diminished--in fact, there had been what I would call a cap placed in May on further expenditures. And he was, therefore, talking to private people to see if they would be interested in trying to do something to support the contra cause.

”. . . I said that, in any way I could, I would certainly be interested in helping.” (North introduced Secord to contra leader Adolfo Calero, who gave him a shopping list of weapons needed by the rebels. Secord took the list to a Canadian arms dealer who did “a pricing exercise.”)

“The list expanded as time went on. Calero liked the prices that we were coming up with, and the prices--by the way, this was a strict, commercial kind of transaction. There was nothing spooky about it. It was just a normal brokering deal. The prices were marked up in the process, different markups for different line items, depending on the size, but between 20% and 30% was the markup, which is quite low in the arms business. And when you average it out, it comes out almost exactly to 20%. . . .”

Airlift Discussed

(In 1984, after Congress barred U.S. military aid to the rebels, the contras’ “sinews of war” grew weak, Secord testified. He, North and contra leaders agreed that a private military airlift was needed to replace the banned U.S. aid, and Secord met with (CIA Director William J.) Casey three times to discuss the issue.)

“We were unable to get the kind of intelligence support which I had requested from the director of the CIA on two occasions. And I personally, in face-to-face conversations, made such requests.

“(The first meeting, before Christmas, 1985,) probably lasted 45 minutes, I would guess. As I said, just the two of us were there. It was a little bit humorous, because at the start of the meeting, he was doing most of the talking, and I was making a few comments, but we were talking about two different countries, and I didn’t realize it for about five minutes.

“He was talking about Iran and I was talking about the Nicaragua scene, so we were hemispheres apart for a while. The director is not the easiest guy I’ve ever communicated with.

”. . . He asked me for my estimate of the situation . . . I told him that, among other things, that I felt that the contras had no chance of prevailing--none whatsoever--if we didn’t get this airlift operation into the field. . . . He told me they were very appreciative of what I was, what I was doing, and he said I had his admiration and asked what he could do. And I explained to him that I needed intelligence information, as I’ve discussed with you gentlemen. He took some notes on that. He was noncommittal. . . .”

Financial Problems

(Secord met Casey again, in February, 1986, to complain about the lack of CIA intelligence support for his airlift, and again two or three months later in North’s presence to discuss military and financial problems.)

“Casey asked me: ‘How much money is needed?’ And I said: ‘Well, that depends on the period of time you’re talking about. Unless the government, the U.S. government, gets back into the support of the contras, we’re not going to make it.’

” . . . I said I thought it would take about $10 million, I thought. And he said, ‘Ten million, ten million dollars,’ and then he mentioned a country which he thought might be willing to donate this kind of money. But then he said: ‘But I can’t approach them.’ Why, I don’t know, and he didn’t say, but he said that two or three times. . . . And North said: ‘Well, somebody damn well better start looking into this thing right away because it’s a rather desperate situation.’

“The director stated that he believed that George, meaning the secretary of state (Shultz), could make an approach, and that was the bottom line. He said he would speak to the secretary of state about this matter. And that was the last time I remember the director.”

(A few months after the meeting, the Sultan of Brunei placed $10 million in North’s Swiss bank account for the contras’ use. A public accounting of the money has yet to be rendered.)