GRAND DELUSIONS : Arabism: Saddam Hussein is but the latest Middle East leader who would unite the long-divided Arab World--and time is on his side

WASHINGTON — The unrealized dream of a unified Arab world is a potent and enduring force in Arab politics. To the outsider, however, this may seem off: The Arab people are victimized, first and foremost, by their own governments and leaders. Many Arabs enthusiastically agree. But they would add that the source of the problem lies in the drive of the outsider to divide, manipulate and weaken the Arab world.

Indeed, until the 20th Century, borders meant very little in the Middle East. Historically, it was the city, not the state, that was the significant political unit. Even today, when an Arab traveller indicates he is en route to Cairo or Damascus, the words he uses could also be translated to mean “Egypt” or “Syria.” The territorial states that have emerged were literally innovations imposed by Euorpeans.

Saddam Hussein, like aspiring Arab nationalists before him, promises to shape the region along Arab lines and to thwart efforts to keep the Arab world divided unto itself. Although his promises sound cynical and transparently self-serving, it would be wrong to dismiss the power of his words. The longer the Iraqi leader is able to hold out against the world, the more credible his calls for widespread Arab support will become. The well-worn vernacular of Arab nationalism may be his most effective weapon.

Arab nationalism--the idea that the Arabs constitute a single distinctive nation united by a history and a common language--emerged only in the latter half of the 19th Century. But it was not transformed into effective political programs until the post-World War II era, when the Arabs broke free of their European masters.

The ideal of Pan-Arabism is reflected in the voting rules of the Arab League, which call for decision-making by consensus. In the continuing Persian Gulf crisis, the rule has been set aside, a measure of the strength of the response evoked by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

It is no accident that minorities--Christians and heretical Muslims--have often been enthusiastic proponents of Arab nationalism. By appealing to a universal identity, they hope to mask the qualities that make them different. In the government-controlled press of Iraq and Syria, the sectarian groups that make up society are virtually never discussed, except as anti-Arab enemies of the nation. Hafez Assad of Syria, whose Alawite sect accounts for less than 15% of Syria’s population, claims his country to be the beating heart of Arab nationalism, of which he is its leading advocate.

In Iraq, the politically dominant Sunni Muslims make up less than 25% of the population but, buttressed by Baathism (Arab renaissance), Hussein emphasizes his nationalist credentials, not his sectarian ones. In reality, both countries are more like rival family businesses than governments.

The ideology that underpins each regime is drawn from Baathism, which advocates the creation of a larger Arab nation as the ultimate expression of freedom. Damascus and Baghdad each claim to be Baathism’s authentic voice. In both capitals, Syria and Iraq are formally described as merely regions of the larger Arab nation. In practice, Syria has shown no desire to extend its influence to Iraq. But Iraq--larger, richer, more powerful--has shown no such reticence.

Baathism has a significant following in Lebanon, as well as in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Reportedly, the pro-Iraq branch of the party has made significant inroads into Mauritania, where Iraq has spread dinars generously and built a base of popular support. Mauritania may be important as a site for the testing of Iraqi rocket missiles, so there is a practical basis for this far-afield effort to spread the word according to Saddam Hussein.

Nasserism

No Arab leader has been able to duplicate the appeal of President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, whose emotional speeches moved an Arab generation. The high-water mark of his influence came in 1958, when Syria fused with Egypt to become the United Arab Republic. This experiment in unification ended three years later, when Egyptian control began to wear away and the Syrians grew weary of playing junior partner.

Even after his catastrophic defeat in the Six Day War in 1967, Nasser maintained his grip on the political soul of the Arab world, where he was simply referred to as al-raais (the president). Once asked to define the Arab nation, he answered that it ends where his propaganda no longer arouses an echo. Nasser’s dreams were put to rest by his successor, Anwar Sadat, who concluded that rhetoric would not feed Egypt.

The man who proclaimed himself heir to Nasserism was Moammar Kadafi, the unguided missile who has led Libya for the past 20 years and whom President Sadat once described as being “crazy in the head.” Kadafi is the undisputed record holder for the most numerous schemes to unify the Arab world. During his reign, he has signed unification agreements with four Arab states--Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Syria. It is widely presumed that it is not Kadafi’s personal magnetism that attracts partners, but his money.

In one of his many memorable remarks, the Libyan leader noted, after signing the unification agreement with Syria in 1980: “Either Libya turns into a unionist state and merges with Syria and bears the losses of the Arab nation, or I shall go to the Galilee as a commando myself with my rifle.” Commando Moammar was never spotted in northern Israel, but the abortive Syrian-Libyan merger did enliven a few political poster collections.

Greater Syria

The states of the Fertile Crescent--Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon--were created, with some reluctance, by Britain and France out of the spoils of World War I. Britain, most especially France, aimed to hold onto the Arab mandates they were granted by the League of Nations in 1920.

With its large Christian community, Lebanon was a natural ally of France, so Paris carved liberal chunks out of Syria to create what was hoped to be a viable “Greater Lebanon.” The added areas, of course, were inhabited by fast-growing Muslim communities, which would outnumber Christians within a few decades.

The Syrian state is technically younger than that of Lebanon. But Syria is a venerable place name--cited even in the Bible. The geographical excisions performed by France did not heal well. Instead, they have kept the idea alive, among some Syrians, that Lebanon is properly a part of Syria.

The idea of a Greater Syria--including Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine--as a geographical and cultural unit has reverberated in Arab politics for decades. It was enthusiastically promoted by King Abdallah, the ruler of Jordan and the grandfather of King Hussein, until his assassination in 1951.

Syria gave birth to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which ven includes the island of Cyprus in its definition of Greater Syria. The party, a rival to the Baath party, is illegal in Syria, but it still counts a few thousand adherents in Lebanon, which is a political museum of Middle East parties and movements.

President Assad’s frequent reference to Syria as the “beating heart of Arab nationalism” is not without reason. Damascus was the principal setting for much of the formative writing on Pan-Arabism, and Assad has been true to that tradition.

But during his 20-year tenure as Syrian president, Assad has sought to establish a loose association of pliant regimes atop of which he would skillfully, but quietly, call the important shots. Assad’s dream has been frustrated by Lebanon.

A Greater Iraq?

There is no question that Hussein sees himself as a man of history--indeed, a redeemer of history. As one of his Iraqi admirers said recently, Iraqi leaders 200 years from now want their people to look back on the era of Hussein.

In large measure, the Iraqi president owes his rise to regional prominence to the revolution in non-Arab Iran. Following the fall of the Shah, it was feared that the self-styled “Islamic Revolution” of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would lurch across the Middle East like a crazed behemoth; Iraq quickly emerged as the state that could tame the beast.

Hussein, of course, had his own problems with the new regime in Iran. Over half of Iraq’s population is Shiite Muslim, and in the fervor of the moment, it was thought that the appearance of the revolution might prove overwhelming to him. As it turned out, the ayatollah’s dream of exporting the revolution proved easier said than done. It foundered in Iraq and, over time, even in disintegrating Lebanon.

Seizing upon the chaos and disorganization gripping revolutionary Iran, Hussein invaded in September, 1980. His goal was to redraw his border with Iran, thereby grabbing the rich, Arab-inhabited oil fields of Khuzistan. Among Hussein’s firmest supporters--in addition to the United States, France and Britain--was the Emirate of Kuwait.

A cursory glance at a map of the gulf indicates the significance of Kuwait to Hussein. Even if the tiny state were not awash in oil, it would still be a key geographic impediment to Iraq’s access to the sea.

Hussein has not, of course, invented Iraq’s claims on Kuwaiti territory. Since Kuwait’s independence in 1961, Iraq has towered over its tiny neighbor like a sullen bully. In 1961, an Iraqi invasion was only forestalled by the prompt intervention of the British; in 1973, the Kuwaiti prime minister was bluntly told that Iraq would not recognize Kuwait’s independence unless it agreed to cede the oil-rich and strategically located islands of Warda and Bubiyan. Iraq enforced her claims by unilaterally deploying soldiers on Kuwaiti territory.

For the moment, Hussein’s dream of a greater Iraq is checked by an international consensus. But he is, as the Arab proverb advises, a man who will kiss a dog in order to take something from it. His remarkable opening to Iran has already produced a restoration of diplomatic relations and a modest breach in the economic blockade. Clearly, it would be a great mistake to underestimate him, or the appeal of his nationalist message.

Pan-Arabism may be a delusion, but men have chased delusions throughout history, often with disastrous consequences. Arbitrary borders, autocratic government and political failure combine to form potent negative evidence of the cost of division and the failure of the Arab world to successfully confront Israel. Hussein offers to rectify this.

It is not surprising that many, but by no means all, Arab governments resist and resent his offer. But Arabs living under oppression and in privation are a natural support base for Hussein; it was entirely predictable that stateless Palestinians would find inspiration in his words of Arab nationalism.

Since the death of Nasser, the Arab world has been waiting for a hero. Others--Assad, Kadafi--have tried out for the role and failed. Now it is Hussein’s turn. The longer he succeeds in frustrating the efforts of George Bush and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the more difficult it will become for his Arab opponents to stand shoulder to shoulder with his enemies. Delusion or not, the dream of an Arab nation is a powerful one, and it looks as though Hussein will wield the dream more skillfully than his opponents have presumed.

Four Unfulfilled Dreams: The vision of one Arab nation united by a common history and language has been a driving force in Arab politics. In part, the region’s history since World War II can be told in a series of maps reflecting how successive Arab leaders would realize that dream. Nasser’s Dream: Egypt and Syria Saddam’s Dream: Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and ‘Palestine’ Assad’d Dream: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and ‘Palestine’ Khomeini’s Dream: Iran, Southern Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain